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THE PROCEDURE FOR ADMITTING AND EXClUDING EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
The procedure for admitting and excluding evidence at 
trial plays a critical role in criminal litigation. If a record is 
not made at trial, there will be no basis for an appeal. 
Article I of the Ohio Rules of Evidence governs this area 
of law. Rule 103 covers rulings on evidence. Rule 104 
governs preliminary question of admissibility. Rule 105 
codifies the concept of limited admissibility. 
RULE 103: RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
Ohio Evidence Rule 103 specifies the procedures 
relating to rulings on evidentiary issues. It covers such 
matters as plain and harmless error, objections, offers of 
proof, and out-of-court hearings. 
Harmless Error 
Rule 103(A) provides that a case will not be reversed 
on appeal because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling 
unless the ruling involves a "substantial right" and the 
other procedural requirements of Rule 103, such as time-
ly objection, have been satisfied. The term "substantial 
right" is not defined in the rule, but the Staff Note indi-
cates that the term refers to the harmless error doctrine. 
The Criminal Rules contain a provision on harmless 
error. Crim. R. 52(A) reads: "Any error, defect, irregulari-
ty, or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded." See 2 Schroeder-Katz, Criminal 
Law, Crim. R. 52. See a/so Ohio App. R. 12(8) (effect of 
prejudicial error). 
In criminal trials, errors involving federal constitutional 
rights must be judged by the federal standard. Under this 
standard, the state must "prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to 
the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967). See generally, 88 Moore's Federal Practice Ch. 
52 (1987); Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal 
Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 
125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15 (1976); Saltzburg, The Harm of 
Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. Rev. 988 (1973). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has extended application of 
the federal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to a 
review of nonconstitutional errors in criminal cases. In 
State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035 
(1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978), the 
Supreme Court wrote: 
Error in the admission of evidence in criminal proceed-
ings is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility 
that the evidence may have contributed to the 
accused's conviction. In order to hold the error harm-
less, the court must be able to declare a belief that the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. /d. 
(syllabus, para. 7). 
Accord, State v. Gilmore, 28 Ohio St.3d 190, 193,503 
N.E.2d 147 (1986) (hearsay); State v. Rahman, 23 Ohio 
St.3d 146, 151, 492 N.E.2d 401 (1986) (privileged testi-
mony); State v. Mann, 19 Ohio St.3d 34, 40, 482 N.E.2d 
592 (1985) ("other-act" evidence). 
The Supreme Court has recognized a difference 
between bench and jury trial cases for purposes of apply-
ing the harmless error doctrine. In State v. Eubank, 60 
Ohio St.2d 183, 398 N.E.2d 567(1979), the Court stated 
that in determining whether error has been harmless "we 
may give weight to the fact that the error occurred in a 
trial to the court, rather than in a jury trial .... Indeed, a 
judge is presumed to consider only the relevant, material 
and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, un-
less the contrary affirmatively appears from the record." 
/d. at 187. See a/so State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151, 
239 N.E.2d 65 (1968); State v. Austin, 52 Ohio App.2d 59, 
70, 368 N.E.2d 59 (1976). 
Objections 
Rule 103(A)(1) requires that an objection or motion to 
strike be made in order to preserve a challenge to the 
admissibility of evidence. This rule serves several 
purposes. First, the objection alerts the trial court to the 
nature of the claim of error, thus facilitating a ruling on 
the objection and providing an opportunity for corrective 
action. Second, it affords opposing counsel an opportu-
nity to take corrective measures. For example, opposing 
counsel, in response to an objection, might be able to 
rephrase the question in unobjectionable terms or might 
withdraw the question and present unobjectionable 
evidence through another witness. 
A failure to object or to move to strike is considered to 
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be a waiver of the objection, and the issue will not be 
reviewed on appeal. See State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 
88, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981}; State v. Williams, 51 Ohio 
St.2d1i2, 364 N.E.2d 1364 (1977), vacated on other 
grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978}; State v. Lane, 49 Ohio St.2d 
77, 358 N.E.2d 1081 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 
438 U.S. 911 (1978}. Withdrawal of an objection also con-
stitutes a waiver. See Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio 
App.2d 21, 32, 371 N.E.2d 557 (1977). Moreover, where a 
court fails to rule on an objection, it will be presumed that 
the court overruled the objection. Kane v. Ford Motor Co., 
17 Ohio App.3d-111, 112, 477 N.E.2d 662 (1984). 
In Bradyv. Stafford, 115 Ohio St. 67, 152N.E 188 
(1926}, the Supreme Court recognized the efficacy of 
"continuing objections," thereby removing the need to 
object iepeatedly to a line of testimony after an adverse 
ruling on an earlier objection: 
Where there has been a sufficient and specific objec-
tion to the admission of testimony concerning a 
conversation, which is overruled ... , it is not neces-
sary to repeat the objection whenever testimony of the 
same class is offered as to the same conversation in 
order that the admission of such testimony may be 
urged as a ground of error in a reviewing court. /d. 
(syllabus, para.2). 
See also McCormick, Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984}. 
Caution, however, demands periodic statements that the 
prior objection still pertains; otherwise, counsel runs the 
risk that an appellate court may construe a continuing 
failure to object as a waiver. 
Another consequence of failing to object is that the 
admitted evidence becomes part of the record of trial and 
may be co_nsidered by the trier of fact, by the trial court in 
ruling on motions, and by a reviewing court. See State v. 
Petro, 148 Ohio St. 473, 76 NE2d 355 (1947); Hastings v. 
Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1978); Unhed 
States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1978}; 
United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th 
Cir. 1977); McCormick, Evidence§ 54 (3d ed. 1984). 
Timeliness of Objection 
Rule 103(A)(1) requires that objections be timely. If a 
question is improper, an objection should be made 
immediately. See Gates v. Dills, 13 Ohio App.2d 163, 164, 
234 N.E.2d 604 (1967} ("Ordinarily, an objection to 
incompetent and improper testimony must be made with 
reasonable promptness."); accord, Powell v. Turner, 16 
Ohio App.3d 404, 407, 476 N.E.2d 368 (1984); State v. 
Stearns, 7 Ohio App.3d 11, 15, 454 N.E.2d 139 (1982); 
State v. McDonald, 25 Ohio App.2d 6, 11,265 N.E.2d 793 
(1970). The rationale for this rule is that counsel should 
not be permitted to wait and see whether the answer is 
favorable before raising an objection. See McCormick, 
Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984). 
In some instances, however, a question's tendency to 
elicit an objectionable response will not become appar-
ent until the response is given. In such cases, a motion to 
strike is required. Johnson v. English, 5 Ohio App.2d 109, 
214 N.E.2d 254 (1966}. Moreover, if a trial court condition-
ally admits evidence subject to its being "connected up" 
later in the trial, a motion to strike is required to remove 
the evidence from jury consideration in the event the 
"connecting up" evidence is never introduced. If a 
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motion to strike is granted, the court should instruct the 
jury to disregard the evidence. See Logan v. Cleveland 
Railway Co., 107 Ohio St. 211, 140 N.E. 652 (1923); Ohio 
Jury Instructions§ 5.20 and 405.10. 
For some purposes, "timeliness" requires that an 
objection be made prior to trial. For example, objections 
based on violations of constitutional rights must often be 
made in the form of pretrial motions to suppress. Grim, R. 
12(8}(3) provides that "[m]otions to suppress evidence, 
including but not limited to statements and identification 
testimony, on the ground that it was illegally obtained" 
must be raised prior to trial. 
Specificity 
Rule 103 requires specific objections; that is, a state-
ment of the grounds upon which the objection is based 
must accompany the objection unless the grounds are 
apparent from the context. Statements such as "I 
object," "Objection, inadmissible," and "Objection, 
incompetent" are general objections. Objections on the 
ground that evidence is ''incompetent, irreievant, and 
immaterial" are also considered general objections. See' 
McCormick, Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984}. 
All grounds for objection should be specified at the 
time the objection is made. "The general rule regarding 
specific objections is that one who has made specific 
objections to the admission of evidence thereby waives 
all other objections and cannot assert such others in the 
appellate court." Johnson v. English, 5 Ohio App.2d 109, 
113, 214 N.E.2d 254 (1966). See also Kent v. State, 42 
Ohio St. 426, 430 (1884}; Gschwind v. Viers, 21 Ohio App. 
124, 152 N.E. 911 (1925}. 
The specificity requirement further demands that -
counsel indicate which particular portion of evidence is 
objectionable. This aspect of the. specificity requirement 
is rarely important with testimonial evidence but arises 
frequently with respect to documentary evidence. Where 
only part of a document is objectionable, counsel must 
specify the objectionable parts. See Carson v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 104, 111, 100 N.E.2d 197 
(1951); State v. Fox, 133 Ohio St. 154, 161-62, 12 N.E.2d 
413 (1938) ("Whenever evidence is offered which is only 
partially objectionable, the complaining party must point 
out the objectionable portion specifically:'). 
Offers of Proof 
When evidence has been excluded by a ruling of the 
trial court, Rule 103(A)(2) requires an offer of proof in . 
order to preserve the error for appeal. The rationale for 
this rule is obvious. Without an offer of proof in the trial 
record an appellate court cannot review the trial court's 
ruling. Thus, in Pokorny v. Local 310 International Hod 
Carriers, 35 Ohio App.2d 178, 300 N.E.2d 464 (1973), 
reversed on other grounds, 38 Ohio Si.2d 177,311 N.E.2d 
866 (1974), the court held: 
When a court sustains objections to a question a state-
ment must be made or proffered as to what the expect-
ed answer would be in order that a reviewing court can 
determine whether or not the action of the trial court is 
prejudicial; and in the absence of a proffer, the exclusiol 
of evidence may not be assigned as error.ld. at 184. 
See also State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 503 N.E.2d 
142 (1986); State v. Hipkins, 69 Ohio St.2d 80, 430 
N.E.2d 943 (1982); State v. Chapin, 67 Ohio St.2d 437, 
424 N.E.2d 317 (1981). In addition, the rule requires 
counsel to articulate the theory of admissibility as well as 
the content of the excluded evidence. See Reese v. 
Mercury Marine Div., 793 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1986). 
F 
' A party cannot be precluded from making an offer of 
proof. "Counsel must be allowed to proffer excluded 
.evidence. This is a prerequisite for appellate review on 
evidentiary rulings .... To exclude a proffer of evidence 
excluded on direct examination is reversible error." State 
v. Hartford, 21 Ohio App.3d 29, 30, 486 N.E.2d 131 (1984). 
An offer of proof may take several forms. An offer of 
testimonial evidence typically takes the form of a state-
ment by counsel as to the expected content of the exclud-
ed testimony. The court, however, may require or be 
asked.to take the "offer" by an examination of the 
witness, including cross-examination. See Rule 103(B) 
(court "may direct the making of an offer in question and 
answer form."); Bolenbaugh v. State, 22 Ohio Abs. 268, 
270 (App. 1936); Posttape Associates v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976). Excluded documentary 
evidence should be marked for identification and 
appended to the record of trial. 
There are several exceptions to the offer of proof 
requirement. First, an offer is not necessary when the 
substance of the excluded evidence is "apparent from 
the context within which questions were asked." Rule 
103(A)(2). See State v. Gilmore, 28 Ohio St.3d 190, 503 
N.E.2d 147 (1986). Second, unlike Federal Rule 103, Rule 
103(A)(2) provides that an "[o]ffer of proof is not neces-
sary if evidence is excluded during cross-examination." 
Frequently, a cross-examiner, conducting a proper but 
exploratory examination, will be unable to state what the 
witness would have said if permitted to answer. In such 
cases, to require an offer of proof would be unfair. See 
Martin v. Elden, 32 Ohio St. 282 (1877); Burt v. State, 23 
Ohio St. 394 (1872); State v. Debo, 8 Ohio App.2d 325, 
222 N.E.2d 656 (1966). Finally, the offer of proof require-
ment is subject to the plain error doctrine. 
Hearing of Jury 
Rule 103(C) requires that discussions involving the 
admissibility of evidence be held outside the hearing of 
the jury whenever practicable. This requirement arises 
from a recognition that the underlying purpose of an 
exclusionary rule of evidence will be defeated if the jury 
is exposed to the excluded evidence through an offer of 
proof or by argument of counsel. The trial judge has 
discretion to require either a side-bar conference or an 
out-of-court hearing. In addition, evidentiary issues may 
be raised prior to trial, either at a pretrial conference 
(Grim. R. 17.1), or by means of a motion in limine. 
Plain Error 
Rule 103(0) recognizes the plain error doctrine, under 
which an appellate court may consider an evidentiary 
error despite a party's failure to make an objection, a 
motion to strike, or an offer of proof at trial. As the federal 
drafters noted, "the application of the plain error rule will 
be more likely with respect to the admission of evidence 
than to exclusion, since failure to comply with normal 
requirements of offers of proof is likely to produce a rec-
ord which simply does not disclose the error." Advisory 
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Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 103. 
The purpose of the plain error doctrine is to "safeguard 
the right of a defendant to a fair trial, notwithstanding his 
failure to object ih timely fashion to error at that trial." 
State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 327, 348 N.E.2d 351 
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976). Grim. R. 52(B) 
specifically recognizes the plain error doctrine in criminal 
cases; it provides that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court." 
The plain error rule applies only to errors that affect 
substantial rights. Attempts to define the doctrine further 
have not been particularly helpful. See State v. Clayton, 
62 Ohio St.2d 45, 47, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 879 (1980) ("plain error is not easily or 
readily definable and ... each case must be considered 
on its own facts."). In State v. Craft, 52 Ohio App.2d 1, 367 
N.E.2d 1221 (1977), the court defined plain error to be: 
[O]bvious error prejudicial to a defendant, ... which 
involves a matter of great public interest having 
substantial adverse impact on the integrity of and the 
public's confidence in judicial proceedings. The error 
must be obvious on the records, palpable, and 
fundamental, and in addition it must occur in excep-
tional circumstances where the appellate court acts in 
the public interest because error affects "the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 
/d. at 7. 
See also Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 
207,209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982) ("A 'plain error' is obvi-
ous and prejudicial ... which, if permitted, would have a 
material adverse affect on the character and public confi-
dence in judicial proceedings."); State v. Long, 53 Ohio 
St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978) (syllabus, para. 3) 
("Notice of plain error ... is to be taken with the utmost 
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to 
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice."); State v. 
Eiding, 57 Ohio App.2d 111, 385 N.E.2d 1332 (1978). See 
generally 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Grim. R. 
52; 8B Moore's Federal Practice Ch. 52 (1987). 
Motions in limine 
Although neither the Ohio nor Federal Rule explicitly 
mentions motions in limine, the use of such motions to 
raise objections prior to trial is common. The trial court's 
authority to consider motions in limine under the Rules of 
Evidence is found in Rule 611(A), which recognizes the 
trial court's general authority to control the presentation 
of evidence. See Rich v. Quinn, 13 Ohio App.3d 102, 105, 
468 N.E.2d 365 (1983) (court has inherent authority to 
entertain motions in limine). 
In State v. Spahr, 47 Ohio App.2d 221,353 N.E.2d 624 
(1976), the court commented on the use of motions in 
limine: 
There is no provision under the rules or the statutes for 
a motion in limine. The request was no more and no 
less than an appeal to the trial court for a precaution-
ary instruction to opposing counsel to avoid error or 
prejudice, such instruction to be effective until admissi-
bility was resolved. Such a request lies in the inherent 
power and discretion of the trial judge to control the 
proceedings. /d. at 224. 
In State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199, 503 N.E.2d 142 
(1986), the Supreme Court wrote: 
Thus, a motion in limine, if granted, is a tentative, inter-
locutory, precautionary ruling by the trial court reflect-
ing its anticipatory treatment of the evidentiary issue. 
In virtually all circumstances finality does not attach 
when the motion is granted. Therefore, should circum-
stances subsequently develop at trial, the trial court is 
certainly at liberty" ... to consider the admissibility of 
the disputed evidence in its actual context." /d. at 
201-02. 
Although a motion in limine is only a tentative ruling in 
Ohio, it serves an important function. The motion may 
prohibit opposing counsel frqm attempting to introduce 
the evidence or from referring to it in the opening state-
ment until the court has ruled finally on its admissibility. 
See McCormick, Evidence§ 52 (3d ed. 1984). 
Several procedural issues relating to motions in limine 
have arisen. First, in order to preserve an evidentiary 
issue for appeal an objection or offer of proof must be 
made at trial. "At trial it is incumbent upon a defendant, 
who has been temporarily restricted from introducing 
evidence by virtue of a motion in limine, to seek the 
introduction of the evidence by proffer or otherwise in 
order to enable the court to make a final determination as 
to its admissibility and to preserve any objection on the 
record for purposes of appeal." State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio 
St.3d 199, 503 N.E.2d 142 (1986) (syllabus, para. 2). 
Accord, State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239,259-60, 473 
N.E.2d 768 (1984). 
Second, in some circumstances an in limine ruling in a 
criminal case may be appealed by the prosecution. 
Any motion, however labeled, which, if granted, 
restricts the state in the presentation of certain 
evidence and, thereby, renders the state's proof with 
respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety 
that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution 
has been destroyed, is, in effect, a motion to suppress. 
The granting of such a motion is a final order and may 
be appealed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and Grim. R. 
12(J). State v. Davidson, 17 Ohio St.3d 132, 477 N.E.2d 
1141 (1985) (syllabus). 
Accord, State v. Fewerwerker, 24 Ohio App.3d 27, 492 
N.E.2d 873 (1985). 
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the effect of 
a motion in limine in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 
(1984). During his trial for federal drug offenses, Luce 
moved in limine to prevent the prosecution from using a 
prior conviction to impeach him. His motion was based 
on Federal Rule 609(a). The trial court denied the motion 
but indicated that the nature of Luce's trial testimony 
might affect its ruling. Luce did not testify at trial. He was 
convicted and appealed. 
On review, the Supreme Court ruled that Luce had 
failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he had 
not testified at trial: "We hold that to raise and preserve 
for review the claim of improper impeachment with a 
prior conviction, a defendant must testify." /d. at 43. The 
Court set forth several reasons for its ruling. First, Feder-
al Rule 609(a) requires the trial court to balance the 
probative value of the prior conviction for impeachment 
purposes against its prejudicial effect. Such an evalua-
tion, in the Court's view, is impossible without knowing 
the precise nature of the defendant's testimony. Second, 
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if the trial court's decision to admit the evidence is 
erroneous, an appellate court is handicapped-in making 
the required harmless error determination without know-
ing the nature of the defendant's testimony. 
RULE 104: 
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY 
Rule 104(A) follows the traditional practice of allocating 
to the trial court the responsibility for ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence. See Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, , 
500, 124 N.E.2d 140 (1955) ("It is elementary that the trial 
judge is to decide those questions of fact which must be 
decided in order to determine whether certain evidence 
is admissible."); Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 132 
Ohio St. 78, 86,5 N.E.2d 153 (1936) ("The competency of 
a witness is a question for the court."). Rule 104(8), 
however, modifies this principle with respect to prelimi-
nary questions involving issues of conditional relevancy. 
Pursuant to Rule 104(A), the trial court decides as a 
preliminary matter questions concerning the "qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness," including the competenJ 
cy of a witness under Rule 601 and the qualifications of 
an expert under Rule 702. See Wagenheim v. Alexander 
Grant & Co., 19 Ohio App.3d 7, 18,482 N.E.2d 955 (1983) 
(expert witness). The court also decides the "existence of 
a privilege" under Rule 501. Finally, the court determines 
as a preliminary matter the "admissibility of evidence," 
for example, whether a statement is hearsay under Rule 
801, and if an exception to the hearsay rule applies under 
Rules 803 and 804. See State v. Knight, 20 Ohio App.3d 
289, 292, 485 N.E.2d 1064 (1984) (dying declaration); 
State v. Snowden, 7 Ohio App.3d 358,361,455 N.E.2d 
1058 (1982) (excited utterance). In short, the "admissibili-
ty of evidence" language entrusts all decisions concern-
ing the application of evidentiary rules exclusively to the 
trial court unless Rule 104(8) applies. See generally 
Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determina-
tion of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165 
(1929); Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of 
Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 
Harv. L. Rev. 392 (1927). 
In some instances, a preliminary question concerning 
the admissibility of evidence requires either a factual 
determination or the application of a legal standard. In 
other instances, resolution of the admissibility question 
requires both. For example, the admissibility of state-
ments falling within the hearsay exception for declara-
tions against interest (Rule 804(8)(3)), depends upon the 
unavailability of the declarant-a question of fact if 
unavailability is based on the death of the declarant. 
Admissibility also depends upon whether the statement 
"possesses the required against-interest characteris-
tics'~the application of a legal standard. Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. 
Application of Rules of Evidence 
According to Rule 104(A) the trial court is "not bound 
by the rules of evidence except those with respect to 
privileges" when ruling on the admissibility of evidence. 
Several arguments have been offered in support of 
dispensing with evidentiary rules in this context. First, 
the rules of evidence are designed principally for jury 
trials. McCormick writes: "Should the exclusionary law of 
evidence, 'the child of the jury system' in Thayer's 
phrase, be applied [in an admissibility] hearing before 
the judge? Sound sense backs the view that it should 
not, and that the judge should be empowered to hear any 
relevant evidence, including affidavits or other hearsay." 
McCormick, Evidence 136 n. 8 (3d ed. 1984). Second, 
practical considerations support suspension of the rules. 
"An item, offered and objected to, may itself be consid-
ered in ruling on admissibility, though not yet admitted in 
evidence. Thus the content of an asserted declaration 
against interest must be considered in ruling whether it is 
against interest. Again, common practice calls for 
considering the testimony of a witness, particularly a 
child, in determining competency." Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. See genera/ly United States v. 
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) ('~t a suppression 
hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other 
evidence, even though that evidence would not be 
admissible at trial."); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 172-73(1974) ("[T]he rules of evidence normally 
applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force 
at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibili-
ty of evidence."); Maguire and Epstein, Rules of Evidence 
in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility,· 36 Yale L. 
J. 1101 (1927). 
Burden and Standard of Proof 
Rule 104(A) provides that the trial court shall decide 
preliminary questions and that the rules of evidence, 
except those relating to privilege, are not applicable. The 
rule, however, does not specify who has the burden of 
proof on the preliminary question or what standard of 
proof is applicable. As a general rule, the party offering 
evidence has the burden of proof on preliminary issues. 
"The opponent merely invokes the law; ... the propo-
nent must make the evidence satisfy the law." 1 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 18, at 841 (Tillers rev. 1983). Also 
as a general rule, the preponderance standard is the 
standard of proof. See Bourjaily v. United States, 107 
S.Ct. 2775, 2779 (1987). There are, however, exceptions in 
criminal cases. See generally Saltzburg, Standards of 
Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 
271 (1975); 1 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 35 
(1977). 
Conditional Relevancy 
Rule 104(8), governing preliminary questions of condi-
tional relevancy, operates as an exception to Rule 104(A). 
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence explained 
conditional relevancy as follows: 
In some situations, the relevancy of an item of 
evidence, in the large sense, depends upon the exis-
tence of a particular preliminary fact. Thus when a 
spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it 
is without probative value unless X heard it. Or if a 
letter purporting to be from Y is relied upon to establish 
an admission by him, it has no probative value unless 
Y wrote or authorized it. Relevance in this sense has 
been labeled "conditional relevancy." ... Advisory 
Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. 
If a preliminary question involves an issue of condition-
al relevancy, the trial court's function is limited. The court 
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does not decide such questions exclusively or with finali-
ty, as is the case with preliminary questions under Rule 
104(A). Rather, the trial court determines only if sufficient 
evidence has been introduced "to support a finding of 
the fulfillment of the condition." If this prima facie stan-
dard is satisfied, the evidence is admitted for the jury's 
consideration. 
Rule 104(8) is a provision of general applicability. 
Several specific rules represent specialized applications 
of the concept of conditional relevancy. For example, in 
applying the firsthand knowledge rule, the trial court 
does not decide whether a witness has firsthand knowl-
edge; the court decides only whether sufficient evidence 
has been introduced "to support a finding that [the 
witness] has personal knowledge of the matter." Rule 
602. Similarly, when ruling on the authentication of a 
document, the trial court does not decide whether the 
proferred document is genuine; the court's decision is 
limited to determining whether there is "evidence suffi-
cient to support a finding that the matter in question is 
what its proponent claims." Rule 901(A). 
The allocation of functions between the court and jury 
which is embodied in the concept of conditional relevan-
cy is based on the concern that entrusting preliminary 
questions exclusively to the court will interfere with the 
jury's proper role. The federal drafters commented: "If 
preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were 
determined solely by the judge, as provided in subdivi-
sion (a), the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would 
be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually 
destroyed. These are appropriate questions for juries." 
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. Moreover, 
unlike rules of competence, such as the hearsay rule, 
there is little danger in permitting the jury to decide such 
issues. For example, if the jury finds that a document is 
not genuine or that a witness does not have firsthand 
knowledge, the jury will disregard the evidence. 
Hearing of the Jury 
Confessions. Rule 104(C), which requires the court to 
hold an out-of-court hearing when ruling on the admissi-
bility of a confession, is constitutionally mandated as a 
result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. 
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See also State v. 
Wigglesworth, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 (1969), 
reversed on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 (1971). This 
provision should be invoked rarely because Grim. R. 
12(8)(3) requires that constitutional challenges to the 
admissibility of confessions be raised prior to trial by a 
motion to suppress. There is little likelihood that a 
confession will be introduced unexpectedly at trial 
because Grim. R. 12(0)(2) entitles the defense, upon 
request, to receive pretrial notice of the prosecutor's 
intention to introduce a confession as evidence in chief. 
See 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Grim. R. 12. 
Rule 104(C) wil_l more often be invoked where the 
prosecution does not intend to introduce a confession in 
its cal?e in chief but attempts to use the confession as 
impeachment evidence. In this situation, Rule 104(C) 
requires an out-of-court hearing on the admissibility of 
the confession. Confessions obtained in violation of an 
accused's Miranda rights may be used for impeachment. 
See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Involuntary confessions, 
however, cannot be used for impeachinenl.SeeMincey 
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
Other preliminary matters. Rule 104(C) provides that 
hearings "on other preliminary matters shall also be 
conducted out of the hearing of the jury when the 
interests of justice require." A similar provision is found in 
Rule 103(C). The la:tter provision, however, does not use 
the interests-of-justice standard; rather, it requires out-of-
court hearings whenever "practicable." 
See also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981) (an 
out-of-court hearing is not automatically required for 
determining the admissibility of identification evidence). 
Testimony by the Accused 
Scope of cross-examination. Rule 104(0) limits the 
scope of cross-examination when a criminal defendant 
testifies on a preliminary matter; such testimony does not 
subject the defendant "to cross-examination as to other 
issues in the case." "The limitation upon cross-examina-
tion is designed to encourage participation by the ac-
cused in the determination of preliminary matters. He 
may testify concerning them without eXposing himself to 
cross-examination generally." Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. A specific ruleoll ci"oss-'examina-
tion on preliminary matters was considered necessary 
because Rule 611(8) adopts the wide-open rule on scope 
of cross-examination in all other proceedings. 
Subsequent use at trial. As both the Ohio Staff Note 
and federal Advisory Committee's Note indicate, Rule 
104(0) does not address the issue of whether the 
accused's testimony on a preliminary matter can be used 
sYbse_qJJf:l.ntly a,ttrial. !3oth t~e Qhioailttf~9~r?l h()tes 
cite several decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Simmons v. Unit~c:l $Jates •. ~~Q.I,L§:.~~Zl J!~!l-~l. !D~ 
Court held that suppression hearing testimony given by a 
defendant in order to establish standing to object to ille-
gally seized evidence could not be used against the 
defendant at trial on the issue of guilt. See also Brown v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Whether the Simmons 
rule extends to the impeachment use of suppression 
hearing testimony has not yet been decided; the· court 
specifically reserved that question in United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). However, in Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court held that statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach 
a defendant at trial. See also Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 
(1975). Similarly, the Court has permitted the impeachment 
use of evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); 
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
Weight and Credibility 
Rule 104(E) provides: "This rule does not limit the right 
of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant 
to weight or credibility." The purpose of this provision is 
to make clear that a court's ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence does not curtail the right of a party to dispute 
the reliability of admitted evidence before the jury. For 
example, if the trial court determines, as a matter of 
constitutional law, that a confession is voluntary, the 
defendant may nevertheless introduce before the jury 
evidence challenging the reliability of the confession. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court considered this issue in Crane 
v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 2142 (1986). The defendant moved 
to suppress a confession on the grounds that it had been 
coerced. The trial court determined that the confession 
was voluntary and denied the motion. At trial, the defen-
dant sought to introduce evidence concerning the 
psychological and physical environment in which the 
confession was obtained to show that it was unreliable. 
The trial court excluded the evidence because it related 
to the voluntariness issue. 
·On review, the Court reversed. Citing Federal Rule 
104(e), the Court stated that the circumstances surround-
ing the.taking~of a confession may be relevant to two sep-
arate issues, one legal and one factual. The legal issue 
concerns the constitutional issue of voluntariness, which 
the court must decide. The factual issue concerns there-
iiability of the confession, an issue which the jury decides. 
According to the Court, the preclusion of evidence on the 
latter issue: deprived the defendant of a fair trial: 
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment ... or in the Compulsory 
Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amend-
ment ... , the Constitution guarantees criminal defen-
dants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense." /d. at 2146 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 
467 u.s. 479, 485 (1984). 
See also State v. Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d 216, 220, 456 
N.E.2d 1287 (1982); State v. Cron, 14 Ohio App.2d 76, 
236 N.E.2d 671 (1967). 
RULE 105: LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY 
Rule 105 recognizes the principle of limited admissibility: 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or 
for one purpose but not admissible as to another party 
or for anotherpurpose is admitted, the court, upon 
request of a party, shall restrict the evidence to its 
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
In many instances, an item of evidence can be used for 
multiple purposes. In some cases this is proper. For 
example, a party's prior inconsistent statement may be 
admitted for impeachment (Rule 613), as well as for 
substantive evidence as an admission (Rule 801(0)(2)(a)) 
Frequently, however, an item of evidence may be admis-
sible for one purpose but inadmissible for another 
purpose. Evidence also may be admissible against one 
party, but not against another party. In such cases Rule 
105 applies, and the court must, upon request, instruct 
the jury as to the limited purpose of the evidence. The 
rule does not preclude the trial court from giving such a 
limiting instruction sua sponte. 
Rule 105 does not change prior Ohio law. In an early 
case, Harrington v. State, 19 Ohio St. 264 (1869), the 
Supreme Court noted that "[i]nstructions advising the 
jury of the object for which particular items of evidence 
are admitted, and cautioning them against being misled 
by their improper use, are certainly proper, and are often 
called for by the circumstances of the case ... "/d. at 270. 
See Ohio Jury Instructions§ 2.60, 5.90 and 402.60 (limit-
ed purpose evidence). 
Rule 105 is written in mandatory language. Upon 
request, a limiting instruction must be given. Refusal to 
instruct is error. See United States v. Washington, 592 
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1979). 
The rule not only directs the court to give a limiting 
instruction upon request, it also requires the courts to 
"restrict the evidence to its proper scope." This phrase is 
not explained in the federal Advisory Committee's Note 
or in the Ohio Staff Note. One purpose of this phrase is to 
limit counsel's use of the evidence to its proper purpose 
during closing argument. See Drake v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 346, 348, 474 N.E.2d 291 (1984) (error 
for counsel to refer in closing argument to evidence ad-
mitted solely for impeachment as if such evidence were 
substantive); United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 919 {3d 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 {1975). This provision 
would also apply to a bench trial, where the court is 
required to limit its use of the evidence to its proper 
purpose but where no instruction is given. See 21 Wright 
& Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5067 {1977). 
Timing of Instruction 
A limiting instruction could be given either at the time 
the evidence is admitted or at the close of the case. In 
Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 {1922), 
the Supreme Court held that a limiting instruction could 
be given at the time of admission or in the general 
charge. In Findlay Brewing Co. v. Bauer, 50 Ohio St. 560, 
35 N.E. 55 (1893), the Court required the instruction to be 
given at the time evidence was received. 
The language of Rule 105 seems to require that the 
instruction be given at the time evidence is introduced: 
"When evidence . .. is admitted, the court, upon request 
~~ of a party, shall ... instruct the jury ... "(emphasis added) 
This interpretation is further supported by the rationale 
underlying Rule 105; the instruction will be more effective 
at the time the evidence is admitted. The federal cases, 
however, have not accepted this reading of the rule. See 
United States v. Wei!, 561 F.2d 1109, 1111 (4th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 839-40 (7th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 362 
{9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 {1976). 
Failure to Request an Instruction 
The failure of a party to request a limiting instruction 
has been held to constitute a waiver. See Agler v. Schine 
Theatrical Co., 59 Ohio App. 68, 17 N.E.2d 118 (1938). 
Not all of the Ohio cases, however, have applied the waiv-
er rule. See Kroger Co. v. McCarty, 111 Ohio App. 362, 
172 N.E.2d 463 (1960). Failure to request a limiting 
instruction should be considered a waiver, except in 
those instances in which the plain error rule applies 
(Rule 103(0)). See United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 
1244 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Regner, 677 F.2d 
754, 757 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911 (1982); 
United States v. Vitale, 596 F.2d 688,689 (5th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); United States v. 
Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 622-26 (5th Cir. 1976). 
To support a finding of plain error despite counsel's 
failure to request a limiting instruction, an appellate court 
must determine that the trial court should have given the 
instruction sua sponte, or, at least, should have asked 
counsel whether an instruction was desired. In some 
situations, the failure to request a limiting instruction is a 
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deliberate tactic employed to avoid overemphasizing 
adverse evidence. If competent counsel chooses this 
course of action, the plain error rule should not apply. 
See United States v. Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907, 920 (7th 
Cir.1983) ("It appears to us that the defendant's attorney 
merely made a tactical decision in declining to ask that 
this statement be struck and a limiting instruction be 
given. Such a tactical decision should not increase the 
defendant's chances of obtaining a reversal."); United 
States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1978) 
("Counsel may refrain from requesting an instruction in 
order not to emphasize potentially damaging evidence ... ". 
Evidence Admissible for One Purpose 
In numerous situations an item of evidence may be 
admissible if offered for one purpose, but inadmissible if 
offered for another purpose. See United States v. Abel, 
469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984) ("But there is no rule of evidence 
which provides that testimony admissible for one 
purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby 
rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case."); 
State ex ref. Brown v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 1 Ohio 
St.3d 151, 156, 438 N.E.2d 120 (1982) ("It is fundamental 
that evidence that is admissible for one purpose may be 
inadmissible for another purpose."). 
The Rules of Evidence specifically address some of 
these issues. For example, Rule 404(8) provides that 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admis-
sible for several purposes, including proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, or identity. Such evidence, however, 
"is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith." An 
instruction limiting such evidence to its proper purpose is 
appropriate. See Ohio Jury Instructions§ 402.61 and 405.23. 
The doctrine of limited admissibility applies to many 
situations which the Rules of Evidence do not explicitly 
address. For example, prior inconsistent statements are 
generally admissible only for the purpose of impeach-
ment. (There is an exception for prior inconsistent state-
ments that satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(0)(1)(a)). 
If offered for impeachment, the statement is relevant only 
because it was made and is inconsistent with in-court 
testimony, not because it was true. If the jury uses the 
statement for the truth of its content, the hearsay rule is 
violated. Accordingly, an instruction limiting the jury's 
use of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment is 
appropriate. See G. M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty 
Co, 166 Ohio St. 401, 405, 142 N.E.2d 854 (1957) (prior 
confession of testifying witness "admissible for only the 
purpose of impeachment of her testimony"). 
Similarly, evidence of prior convictions typically is 
admissible only for impeachment. See Rule 609. There is 
a danger, however, that when such evidence is 
introduced the jury might use it as character evidence on 
the merits of the case, especially if the witness is the 
accused in a criminal case. This latter use of prior convic-
tion evidence is prohibited by Rule 404(A); hence, an 
instruction limiting the use of this type of evidence is 
appropriate. See State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio St. 221, 174 
N.E.2d 543 {1961) (syllabus, para. 2) ("conviction of a 
witness for an offense ... may be shown for the purpose 
of affecting his credibility"); Ohio Jury Instructions§ 
402.60 and 405.22. · 
Evidence Admissible Against One Party 
Rule 105 provides that when an item of evidence is 
admissible against one party, but not against another 
party, a limiting instruction must be given upon request, 
directing the jury to use the evidence against the proper 
party. See also Ohio Jury Instructions§ 405.40 (several 
defendants); Webb v. Grimm, 116 Ohio App. 63, 186 
N.E.2d 739 (1961). 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in-Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), that a limiting instruction in a 
joint trial was insufficient to protect against improper jury 
use of one defendant's confession which implicated a 
codefendant. Once the Court concludedthat there exist-
ed a "substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to 
the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial 
statements in determining the petitioner's guilt," it ruled 
that the defendant had been denied his Sixth Amend-
ment right to confrontation because his right to cross-
examine the codefendant about the statement had been 
foreclosed. !d. at 126. In subsequent decisions, the Court 
held Bruton applicable to state trials (see Roberts v. 
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968)), and subject to the harm-
less error doctrine (see Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 
250 (1969)). See also State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 
407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980); State v. Utsler, 21 Ohio App.2d 
167, 255 N.E.2d 861 (1970); State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio 
App.2d 123, 123 n. 1, 247 N.E.2d 482, 483 n. 1 (1969). 
There are several ways in which the Bruton issue can 
be obviated. First, separate trials avoid the problem 
raised in Bruton. If the codefendants have been properly 
joined for trial under Crim. R. 8(B), the proper remedy is 
a motion to sever for prejudice pursuant to Crim. R. 
12(B)(5)and 14.The trial court has discretion to grant 
such a motion. If codefendants have been improperly 
joined under Crim. R. 8(E3), the.Pf<JPE!f remedy is a 
motion for severance for misjoinder pursuant to Crim. R. 
8 and 12(B)(2). In such cases, the defendant need not 
show prejudice, and the trial judge must sever. See 
generally 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal Law, Crim. R. 
8 and Crim. R. 14. 
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Second, the prosecution can delete.(redact}aiLrefer-
ences in the confession that relate to the codefendant. 
See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 n. 10 
(1968); State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 342, 86 N.E.2d 
24 (1949). Redaction, however, is not always effective. 
"There are, of course, instances in which such editing is 
not possible; the references to the codefendant may be 
so frequent or so closely interrelated with references to 
the maker's conduct that little would be left of the state-
ment after editing." ABA Standards Relating to Joinder 
and Severance 38 (1967). The Supreme Court sanc-
tioned the redaction procedure in Richardson v. Marsh, 
107~S.Gt: 1702 (1987): "We hold that the Confrontation 
Clause is not violated by the admission ofa nontestifying 
codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruc-
tion when, as here, the confession is redacted to elimi-
nate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to 
her existence." /d. at 1709. 
Third, the Bruton problem can be avoided, at least in 
some instances, if the codefendant testifies at trial. 
Under these circumstances the defendant has the oppor· 
tunity to cross-examine the codefendant on the accuracy 
of the out-of-court statement, thereby obviating the 
confrontation issue. The Supreme Court took this posi-
tion in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971): "We 
conclude that where a codefendant takes the stand in his 
own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court 
statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to 
testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underly-
ing facts, the defendant has been denied no rights 
protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." /d. 
at 629-30. See also State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d 112, 
381 N.E.2d 960 (1978). ·~ 
The Court has decided several other Bruton issues. In 
CnJZ v. New York, 107 S.Ct. 1714 (1987), the C()wrt held 
that Bruton applied to "interlocking confessions:' In 
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), the Court ruled 
that Bruton was not violated by the prosecution's use of 
an accomplice's statement in rebuttal. 
